Contested Ideas within The Federalist

The United States’ first national government during the post-Revolutionary period was short lived. Founders who established the Articles of Confederation did so in response to the sentiment of the people at large: a fear of executive power led to the absence of an executive; distrust for national politicians led to a weak, nearly powerless Congress and strong state governments. These provisions did not provide the structure necessary for a united central government. The states sent delegates to Philadelphia for a convention that would reshape the government as it was then constituted. The convention resulted in a new Constitution that was to be ratified by each state in ratifying conventions.

            Writing a new Constitution was not an easy task for the framers. Forrest McDonald, professor of history at the University of Alabama, studied the wide range of ideological influence that influenced the document created at the convention. Ideological schools which McDonald covered include, among others, the Nationalists (specifically the “Court Party” Nationalists), Republican Ideologues, Puritanical Republicans, and Agrarian Republicans. As the Constitution was sent out for ratification, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay wrote a number of essays arguing in behalf of the new Constitution. The Federalist, as the compilation of these essays was called, was as ideologically diverse in its origins as was the Constitution. Federalist No. 10 and 51, both written by Madison, were good examples of the internal conflict of ideas. No. 70, written by Hamilton, is an example of consistency within.

            The intellectual origins of The Federalist #10 were, to some extent, internally contested. James Madison wrote this essay under the pseudonym of “Publius.” He began the essay with an observation of the history of popular governments. Confusion, violence, and instability were constant throughout many of them, including the State governments during the early years of the Union. Faction, according to Madison, was the “mortal disease” of popular government.[1] Madison derived much of this idea from the Republican Ideologues. Republican Ideologues were horrified by the idea that passions ruled men, groups, and governments.  One of their main concerns was corruption, which made it hard to trust any man with a significant amount of power.[2] Madison defined a faction as a group, whether majority or minority, that is brought together by a common inclination of passion or interest, adverse to individual rights or to the public good.[3] Factions were adverse to the public good, because one of the key principles of puritanical or classical republicanism was public virtue. According to this sentiment, men should be independent and individualistic toward the end of communal good.[4]

            The Federalist #10 was also mildly influenced by Agricultural Republicanism and the “Court Party” Nationalists. Madison saw two options for dealing with factions: remove their causes or control their effects. Removing their causes would require establishing a will that is independent of society.  Diversity of opinions and unequal faculties for obtaining property, according to Madison, were “sown into the nature of man.”[5] Puritanical Republicanism, which sought moral solutions to moral problems, would oppose any such imposition of an independent will in society.[6]  Society must, therefore, control the effects of factions. Agrarian Republicans would say that in order to do so, adequate social, political, and economic institutions needed to be put in place.[7] David Hume, a Scottish philosopher and major influence on Nationalist ideology, also said that these institutions are what set up a nation for success, not morals alone.[8] There seemed to be some disagreement between the Agrarian Republican-Nationalist ideas and the Republican Ideologue-Puritanical Republican ideas found within the text. The disagreement centered around one major point: what was the right way to deal with moral issues within society. The former held to socio-political-economic solutions; the latter held to moral solutions to moral problems.

James Madison, author of Federalist 10 and 51

            Federalist No. 51 was even more ideologically contested than No. 10. James Madison, again using the name Publius, made the argument for a separation of powers within the national government. It was the government’s structure, Madison claimed, that made liberty possible.[9] This claim was strongly backed by the ideas of both Agrarian Republicans and the “Court Party” Nationalists. As was mentioned above, Agrarian Republicans thought that making better arrangements provided the solutions and the “Court Party” Nationalists clung to Hume’s idea of institutions as the pathway to success.  Madison then made the point that the people should elect every position within the national government, but they did not always understand the qualifications for those positions. He cited the example of judges. Everyday voters had no conception of the training and qualifications necessary for such a position.[10] The Republican Ideologues were strong proponents of similar sentiments in regards to direct democracy, though they were more outspoken on the subject. To the Ideologues, excess of democracy needed to be checked by strengthening the central authority. As the central authority was strengthened, more controls would be needed. Separating the three main responsibilities of government would be vital to the controls on the ambitions of individuals therein, according to both Madison and the Republican Ideologues.[11] Ideologues’ fear of corruption gave Madison’s Nationalist-based argument its foundation.

Alexander Hamilton, author of Federalist 70

            Unlike No. 10 and 51, Federalist No. 70 was in generally consistent. Nationalist sentiment was central to each theme of the essay. Alexander Hamilton, who penned this essay, was closely tied to the “Court Party” Nationalists.[12] His affiliation therein was apparent in his argument for an energetic and forceful Executive. He claimed that energy was essential to good government. Administration and execution of the law, especially regarding national security and protection of property rights, required an Executive with adequate power to do so. An Executive with this power would protect liberty when factions, anarchy, or the ambitions of others infringe upon it.[13] Nationalists focused their ideology around the need to reorganize and strengthen the central authority, and this need is what fueled Hamilton’s argument.[14] It was impossible, according to the “Court Party” Nationalists, for public virtue to exist at the levels that puritanical republicanism required. Ambition and avarice were considered “the ruling passions.”[15] Hamilton argued that allowing the Executive to pursue his ambition would give him reason to work hard. Hamilton also argued for a single Executive, in order to protect the public good from infringement by the Executive’s ambition. When there is one Executive, he argued, there would always be someone to blame.[16] This argument tied back to Hume’s notion of institutions as the recipe for success. The very structure of the office of Executive would compel the Executive to work hard and to avoid any usurpation.

            The examples of contested ideas within The Federalist showed the struggle that the founders of the Constitution faced.  Not only were there contesting ideas between individuals and groups, but there were contested ideas within individuals and groups. Forrest McDonald showed that coming to the knowledge of what the founders meant would be exceptionally complex. He argued that there was not a single idea that formed the words of the Constitution. There were multiple interpretations of the political and social ideologies that were present at the time. By studying this contest of ideas, McDonald showed that the desires of the founders, as varied as they were, drove them to compromise.  The fact that a Constitution so short in length, and yet so broad in influence and interpretation even came out of the convention was astonishing. The founders’ desire to protect their liberty and property, however they interpreted them, caused them to work together to create what would become the new foundation for the political structures of the Western World.

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[1] James Madison, “No. 10: The Same Subject Continued: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection,” in The Federalist, 1787.

[2] Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985) 199.

[3] James Madison, “No. 10.”

[4] Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 70.

[5] James Madison, “No. 10.”

[6] Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 71.

[7] Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 71.

[8] Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 210-11.

[9] James Madison, “No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments,” in The Federalist, 1787.

[10] James Madison, “No. 51.”

[11] Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 202; James Madison, “No. 51.”

[12] Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum,186-87.

[13] Alexander Hamilton, “No. 70: The Executive Department Further Considered,” in The Federalist, 1787.

[14] Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 185.

[15] Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 191.

[16] Alexander Hamilton, “No. 70.”